carrying in it a certain element of identity. The more separative attitude is ordinarily the method of our reason in observing and knowing our inner movements; the more intimate is the method of our dynamic part of mind associating itself with our sensations, feelings and desires: but in this association too the thinking mind can intervene and exercise a separative dissociated observation and control over both the dynamic self-associating part of mind and the vital or physical movement. All the observable movements of our physical being also are known and controlled by us in both these ways, the separative and the intimate; we feel the body and what it is doing intimately as part of us, but the mind is separate from it and can exercise a detached control over its movements. This gives to our normal knowledge of our subjective being and nature, incomplete and largely superficial though it still is, yet, so far as it goes, a certain intimacy, immediacy and directness. That is absent in our knowledge of the world outside us and its movements and objects: for there, since the thing seen

• or experienced is not-self, not experienced as part of us, no entirely direct contact of consciousness

with the object is possible; an instrumentation of
:sense has to be used which offers us, not immediate
intimate knowledge of it, but a figure of it as a
first datum for knowledge.
In the cognition of external things, our knowledge has an entirely separative basis; its whole
-machinery and process are of the nature of an